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Civic Constitutionalism, the Second Amendment, and the
Right of Revolution
Indiana University Distinguished Faculty Research Lecture
April 23, 2003
DAVID C. WILLIAMS*

Chancellor Brehm, Dean Andrews, Vice-President Walker, Dean Robel, I am
most grateful for your kind remarks. It's wonderful to be here. My mother and most
of her siblings attended this university in the 1940s and 1950s. They were all small
town kids, right off the farm. And on her first day in college, when all the freshman
class was gathered, my mother climbed a lamp-post so that she could see all the
students, because she had never seen so many people in one place before. For her
and for so many, this university was and is a place of magic, where the whole
world comes to Indiana. Afterwards, my family came back to visit every summer,
and I grew up loving Bloomington. And then about a dozen years ago, my wife and
I came here to teach at the law school, very much on a trial basis, to see whether
the fit was good. And from the first week, wonderful people at this place have
nurtured us-people like Fred Aman, Lauren Robel, and many others. They helped
us figure out who we wanted to be, and then they helped us try to become those
people. Without sentiment, I can say that I owe these friends more than I can repay.
So it is good to see people from the law school here today. But I am also very
happy to see colleagues and students from outside the law school. I know that when
you are not a lawyer, it takes a certain courage to come to a talk by a lawyer: you
might imagine that it's going to be arcane and obscure to all but the initiate. But
part of what I hope to suggest today is that law, or at least constitutional law,
should not segregate itself in that way. Indeed, I mean to argue that the Constitution
cannot usefully be studied in isolation from the rest of American sociopolitical life.
And for that reason, a great law school has need of a great university; ideally, the
law school should enter deeply into the general intellectual life of the institution, in
the same way that the anthropology or economics or classics departments should.
In a narrow sense my subject today is the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which famously reads, "A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."1 This provision is much in the news, and the political
issue that gives it life is gun control. One school of thought, held by the National
Rifle Association and the current United States attorney general, maintains that the
amendment protects the right of private citizens to own guns for self-defense,
hunting, or other lawful purposes. This view focuses on the second clause of the
amendment, which maintains that "the right of the people"-meaning, for these
interpreters, private individuals--"shall not be infringed." As a result, much gun
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control should be constitutionally suspect. A contrary school of thought, held by
the lobbying group Handgun Control, Inc. and most federal appeals courts, is that
the amendment protects only the right of the states to maintain their militias. This
view focuses on the first clause of the amendment, which posits that "a wellregulated militia" is "necessary to the security of a free state." For that reason and
only for that reason, according to this account, do we protect the people's right to
arms. As a result, gun control of private arms should be constitutionally
unproblematic. The debate over the Second Amendment thus has a particular tone
and content. For most people, the amendment conjures a set of images that grow
from the modem experience with violent crime: Some imagine the horror of guns
in the hands of deranged killers, guns that should be locked somewhere in a
government vault; others imagine guns in the hands of virtuous citizens who use
them to repel the very same deranged killers.
But I would like to propose that the Second Amendment is much more than
this contemporary policy debate. Indeed, I think that the Second Amendment can
best be understood as a prism that allows us to understand the whole constitutional
enterprise, rather than as a rule about any particular issue. And in this guise, the
Second Amendment may be the most important provision of the whole
Constitution. To many lawyers, that claim will seem odd, because the Second
Amendment has been often ignored by the legal establishment and often embraced
by crackpot activists. And the truth is that I have no idea how to assess which
provision is the most important, so you can offer the First Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment or even the Commerce Clause as the most important one,
and despite our disagreement, we can still be friends. But I do want to suggest that
the Second Amendment, no less than those others, reveals something deeply
important about what it means to do constitutional law, or be constitutionalist, or
even just to live in a constitutional republic. And that is why I have said that only in
a narrow sense is my subject the Second Amendment; in a broad sense, the subject
is constitutionalism itself.
To make the general claim, let me begin with two different paradigms of the
function and purpose of the United States Constitution. The first was a virtual
orthodoxy for many decades; the second has old roots but is newly emergent or reemergent. Here is the first paradigm. In 1975, if you had asked a typical legal
academic about the nature of the Constitution, he might have said something like
this: The Constitution is fundamentally a law, and so it belongs primarily to courts.
In fact, the United States Supreme Court has final say over its meaning through the
process of judicial review. And every other citizen and governmental body is
obligated to follow the Court's edicts. The Court is given this power because of its
ability to stand apart from politics. As a result, the Court can protect individual
rights against populist pressure, the angry baying for blood of a bigoted and illinformed electorate. Indeed, many distinguished legal academics have argued that
what it means to be constitutionalist is to have judicially entrenched protections for
individual rights. We could call this vision the "juristic paradigm of the
Constitution."
The other paradigm begins with a different role for the Constitution: In this
view, what mostly happens in a constitution is that a people establish a
government. And in constituting a government, the people are also constituting
themselves as a distinct political society, with something in common, even if it is
only commitment to the structure of the very government that they are creating,
with all its implicit values. For that reason, the United States Constitution also
delineates the core essentials of an American identity, however vague or
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controverted it might be. But if that is the central goal of a constitution, then the
central actor is not the Court but the people themselves, or perhaps I should say the
People itself, as a singular noun-the people who make the constitution, who are
responsible for its maintenance, who glimpse themselves in it, and who may
perhaps cause its unmaking. We could call this vision 'the civic paradigm of the
Constitution.'
Both of these views have deep, old resonances. When I was in law school, my
professors told stories about Sir Edward Coke, who as chief justice resisted the
growing absolutism of the Stuart Kings in the name of a higher law. In 1608 at
Hampton Court, Coke finally confronted the king, and with his finger in the air,
peremptorily informed him, "Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et
lege."2 If your Renaissance Latin is a little rusty, that means: "The king ought not
to be under man but under God and the law." And of course, placing the king under
the law was pretty much ipso facto treasonous. So I have this image of this great
judge speaking truth to power, and even now it makes my heart beat a little faster.
And I always tell this story to my Constitutional Law students, because it captures
the power of the juristic vision so nicely.
But there is another story to be told about the origins of constitutionalism.
Beginning in the thirteenth century, medieval jurists began to argue that the king
held his power by delegation from the people. Eventually this argument would
become seriously subversive: The people made the king, gave him instructions, and
could unmake him if he proved faithless to his charge. Like the Coke story, this one
is about resisting absolute power. But in this case, the principal hero is not a trained
lawyer speaking for a higher law in defense of individual rights. Instead, the hero is
the people speaking for a collective identity expressed in and through law, the law
that creates and limits their government. And the defining habit of this people is not
legal study but political mobilization, public dialogue, and sometimes even selfarming. Both stories-the juristic and the civic-begin in resistance to government,
and as we will see, that fact is significant for the meaning of the Second
Amendment. But the two stories grow out of quite different historical experiences
of resistance: On the one hand, a judge searching his conscience, his texts, and his
traditions; and on the other hand, a people coming into a sense of itself as a self
with dignity and power. And what I want to argue today is that constitutionalism in
general and the Second Amendment in particular need this civic paradigm; the
Constitution cannot be merely juristic.
To make that case, let me emphasize two differences between the stories. First,
as a matter of academic study, the civic constitutionalist view makes it even more
important that academic lawyers be well integrated into the academic community
as a whole. The reason is that if the Constitution is an expression of collective
identity, then its proper study must extend to that collective identity. And for that
end, lawyers need anthropologists, sociologists, historians, political theorists, and
the like. Indeed, it might make sense to re-imagine the disciplinary divisions:
Rather than being first and foremost lawyers and political scientists and historians,
we might imagine our shared field as the domain of constitutional studies. In fact,
something of the like has been occurring in writing on the Second Amendment:
Some have begun speaking of Second Amendment studies, with contributions from
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lawyers, public health professionals, criminologists, historians, and political
theorists. By contrast, if the Constitution is merely a set of judicially enforced rules,
then some would claim that the Supreme Court should enjoy an ultimate authority
in its interpretation, and lawyers should command an overriding preeminence in its
exposition.
Here is the second difference between the two accounts: As a matter of
constitutional practice, the civic constitutionalist view would give the people a
central role not only in formal amendment but also in constitutional maintenance,
interpretation, evolution, and termination. I should note that although civic
constitutionalists agree among themselves that the people should have more of a
role, they do not agree on the exact nature of that role. Commentators such as
Mark Tushnet, Sanford Levinson, Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, and John Finn all
stake out slightly different claims. 3 In a moment, I will suggest that the best
approach may be contextual: The people should occupy the particular roles that the
constitutional structure needs them to occupy, not some global and abstract
function. I think, for example, that the people as a collectivity have a central role in
giving meaning to the Second Amendment.
By contrast, for juristic constitutionalists, the people make the constitution, but
then they mostly retire, leaving their written work in the good hands of sagacious
judges. After making the constitution, these individuals make money, pursue
callings, raise families, join houses of worship, and vote. They may even own guns
for private pursuits, such as hunting or target practice, but surely not to keep a
check on the government. To be sure, these people may formally amend the
constitution, but they are not really supposed to, at least not very often: The
amendment process is difficult precisely so as to keep the baying hounds of
populism away from our judicially protected rights. We might almost imagine
Chief Justice Coke with finger in the air, reproving the people to remember that
their Constitution is sacred. In the words of John Marshall, "The exercise of this
original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently
repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as
the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are
designed to be permanent. '4
In sum, then, the juristic Constitution assigns dominant and perhaps exclusive
authority to the judiciary, but the civic Constitution seeks to engage the people
directly in the processes of constitutionalism. Formulating the distinction in that
way makes me feel that I am stacking the deck in favor of civic constitutionalism:
After all, who could deny that both the people and the courts should be engaged
with their Constitution, should have something to say about its meaning, should
shape its future? It seems plain that even juristic constitutionalists must pay heed to

3. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999); Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989);
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the Constitution's civic dimension, because in the long run judges need popular
support for the protection of rights. And yet oddly, many legal scholars have in fact
argued that constitutionalists should affirmatively ignore everything except the law
as practiced by judges and members of the bar.
In this view, the Constitution is part of the world of law, and the law is a selfcontained discourse with a special set of referents, principles, and ideas. To hold
that the law must go beyond itself is to invite politics or values or something
equally indeterminate into the hallowed temple of Reason. And if that ever
happens, our rights will rest on nothing more stable than the shifting sands of
public opinion. Again, this view grows out of historical experience. The halcyon
days of the juristic Constitution were the decades following World War II, when
the world wondered how fascism had overwhelmed Germany and Italy. Some legal
academics concluded that Europe had been plunged into darkness because its
politics-the baying hounds of populism--overwhelmed its respect for law and
individual rights. What Hitler really needed was a Lord Coke with his reproving
finger in the air. So America should be at root a legal nation, with law and politics
sharply divided, and the development of law should occur only through the
reasoned elaboration of its own internal structure.
To be honest, I am not sure whether anyone endorses that view in its extreme
version anymore. I am not sure how many really endorsed it even in 1965. If the
rest of social life goes sour, the law will not save you-as even juristic
constitutionalists must realize, at least in their unguarded moments when they are at
home in their socks. And that means that to fulfill the promise of a rights-based
constitutionalism, you must pay keen attention to the content of the citizens'
character. In fact, the historical practice of juristic constitutionalism itself illustrates
this theme. From about 1954 to about 1975, the Supreme Court undertook a
constitutional revolution to protect those whose rights were most imperiled by the
hounds of populism, and many hoped that the Court might eventually remake
America in a more progressive image. But a funny thing happened on the way to
the future: Much of America did not come along for the judicial ride. Instead,
something of a backlash occurred. And as political America retrenched, so
eventually did the Supreme Court itself, as conservative presidents appointed
conservative justices. As a result, the Court's attention turned from desegregation,
voting rights, and sexual and procreative rights, to federalism, property rights, and
rights against affirmative action. And now we face a rather pointed irony: In the
1960s many progressives celebrated judicial activism, but they now want to take
the Constitution out of the hands of the Court; and in the 1960s, many
conservatives denounced judicial imperialism, but they now defend the rule of
judges against the pollution of a debased democracy. I would call this irony
delicious, but I realize that it may not be to your taste.
I do find it delicious, but for a particular reason. It would be possible to
perceive this flip-flopping through the lens of a vulgar legal realism: lawyers favor
judicial activism when the courts are controlled by their friends, but they counsel
judicial restraint when the courts are dominated by the other guys. In other words,
legal theory is merely a matter of whose ox is gored. But I think that there is a
deeper truth at work: When you control the courts, you tend to appreciate the real
benefits of the juristic Constitution, and when you don't, you tend to appreciate that
the nation cannot do without civic constitutionalism. In other words, the reason that
some have flip-flopped is that their new perspective--their inclusion in, or exile
from, judicial power-has brought them genuine new insights. And particularly, a
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good-sized slice of the legal professoriate has newly glimpsed certain benefits in
giving the people a role in the processes of constitutionalism.
So let me now recount some of those purported benefits-and because of the
constraints of time, I offer these in shorthand and without any real effort at defense.
First, it has become difficult to maintain that judicial analysis is uniquely truer or
more objective or insightful than other sorts of reflection on the Constitution. It has
also become difficult to maintain that legal analysis is radically independent of all
other kinds of analysis. There are even those who hint that Supreme Court justices
incorrigibly consult their own political values in deciding cases. Yet if judicial
analysis is not uniquely better at finding the Constitution's meaning, it is not clear
why the Court should enjoy an exclusive or preeminent role in interpreting this
document that serves as the fundamental civic morality for the country as a whole.
It would be easy to get carried away with this point. Six weeks into
Constitutional Law, a number of my students suffer what I think of as a rule of law
attack. They realize that Constitutional Law is not objective in the strong sense that
they had hoped, and so they become completely disillusioned with the Supreme
Court. If the Court is not perfect, they wonder, why even keep it? Well, there are
reasons. Judicial analysis is one sort of discourse with its own particular strengths,
and probably no American constitutionalism can rightly dispense with it. But it is
just one kind of discourse, and there are others with other strengths to bring to the
table, so it is not clear why the Court's discourse should hold such dominanceexcept that the Court has said that it should.
Second, standing on its own, judicial review is a feeble protection for the
Constitution. If the people, their presidents, and their representatives are
implacably opposed to the Court's work, the Court will not in the long run prevail.
Again, it would not do to overstate this point. The Court may prevail when
opposition is diffuse or when the legislative majorities opposing it are slim or
unstable. It may get ahead of the curve of change and push the legislature in the
direction that it was already moving anyway. And sometimes it may even shame
the legislature into facing up to a problem that it would have liked to ignore. But in
the long run, if the people hold one vision of their Constitution and the courts hold
another, the courts are not going to win. The best example here may also be the
most famous: in the Dred Scott case, the Supreme Court held that the federal
government could not prohibit slavery in the territories. 5 Lincoln thought that it
could, and the nation fought a great civil war over this question. The Court's view,
happily, did not prevail.
Well, why are so many lawyers so worried about giving the people a role in
the interpretation of their own Constitution? The reason, of course, is that lawyers
tend believe that ordinary Americans are not properly qualified to interpret the
Constitution. They haven't been trained to think things through, pondering the
effects down the line or on different sectors of the population. They tend to respond
out of short-sighted passion and personal self-interest, and they often confuse their
own separate good with the common good. As a result, different groups are likely
to offer different interpretations of the Constitution, creating a chaos of legal
hermeneutics. And this situation is precisely what the Constitution was supposed to
forestall: it was designed to give a stable structure to make unum e pluribus. In this
view, the Court is ideally situated to serve that end. Because they have life tenure
and independence, the judges can offer sober, steady reflection, and because they

5. See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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are a single body, they can offer a single definitive interpretation of our common
frame. And so the Court keeps us from each other's throats. In the Court's own
words, sometimes "the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the
national division by
contending sides of a national controversy to end their
6
accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution."
It would be easy to belittle this fear of populist constitutionalism as elitist
lawyers protecting their turf. But actually, I think that the fear is neither baseless
nor silly, and though there may be some turf protection about it, it's not only that.
I've spent a good bit of the last decade studying material in which ordinary
Americans express their view of the Constitution's meaning. Gunowners, for
example, read and think and talk endlessly about the Second Amendment, because
they think that it says something about their right to arms. Many motorcyclists
believe that the Constitution protects their right to ride a motorcycle and not to
wear a helmet. And many disgruntled groups believe that their states have a
continuing constitutional right to secede from the Union; some even think that they
have the right to secede from the social contract as individuals.
This material generally has two notable characteristics. First, it does suffer
from all the vices that lawyers might imagine. It is full of immoderate passion, and
it frequently fails to take any perspective seriously other than the writer's own-as
though other Americans do not exist or have a right to be counted. For that reason,
these popular interpreters of the Constitution often disagree vociferously among
themselves, all the while proclaiming that anyone who disagrees must be a rogue or
a knave or just can't read the plain English of the Constitution's text. So at first
blush, this material does not give one a great deal of hope for popular
constitutionalism.
And yet there is another, more hopeful quality to this writing, a quality that is
quite remarkable: These writers are seeking to express their deepest fears and hopes
through the language of constitutional argument. When they talk about guns or
motorcycles or secession, they are offering far more than a technical claim about
the rules laid down. Instead, they are trying to speak of their basic cultural identity,
of what it means to be an American. And when they seek to explain this
fundamental sense of their civic selves, they express themselves in constitutional
terms because they believe that in the Constitution they will find the fundamental
truth of our common life. Though these writers are often very angry-indeed some
write about shooting other Americans-they still think that we are bound together
through this document. It is a clichd of American culture that we are united not by a
common language, ethnicity, religion, or history but by a common collection of
values rooted in the Constitution. These popular writers, as schismatic as they may
seem, plainly think so. In fact, I sometimes wish that certain lawyers and judges
brought to the constitutional enterprise the kind of passion and reverence that these
writers bring to it.
So here is the hope of civic constitutionalism as currently practiced: Although
these writers may not be good at constitutional interpretation, they really want to do
it. Even the most odious demagogue of the militia movement-racist, violent, and
hate-filled--thinks that the best way to connect to others is through constitutional
argument. That's our claim on each other. And so for civic constitutionalism to

6. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
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work, what's important is that ordinary Americans should want to engage with the
Constitution in a better way. What's important, in other words, is to redeem the
people.
And how do we redeem the people? Civic constitutionalists have traditionally
answered that the people will responsibly embrace the Constitution only when they
are given a responsible role in supporting the Constitution. If the judiciary alone
has charge of the Constitution, then the people lose any sense that they must care
for it: We need not protect it because they will. And though this point is a tired old
chestnut, there is surely truth in it. The Second Amendment illustrates the point
nicely: Politicians can make wild claims about the amendment's meaning for
political gain, with the assurance that the Supreme Court will keep those claims
from actually becoming law. For example, to please his gun-owning constituents, at
least one local politician has reportedly argued that the amendment protects the
right to keep a nuclear bomb in your garage. It is hard to believe that this .was
anything more than campaign rhetoric, yet the speaker feels free to make it because
he believes that the Court will never let it come to pass. And thus judicial
exclusivity helps to facilitate this kind of rhetoric, with the result that we never
develop a more responsible dialogue.
At this point, however, many lawyers head for the hills, because the prospect
of redeeming the people seems so utopian: Do we really want to commit our
fundamental public morality to the average American citizen, who cannot even tell
you the name of the Vice-President or a single federal statute? And that impulse is
entirely understandable. But before we yield to it entirely, let's talk for a little bit
about the Second Amendment-because I think that reflection on the amendment
offers three reasons to hold out hope for redemptive civic constitutionalism.
First, moving to civic constitutionalism must be incremental and gradual. Of
course, it would not be a good idea for citizens to decide the constitutional duties of
the Vice-President if they have no idea what he or she does. But the point is that
practice may make perfect, so that as the people practice taking responsibility for
their Constitution, they may get better at it. Second, we should refrain from
imagining the choice as dichotomous: Either the Court has complete constitutional
authority, or the people do. Instead, we should be asking what good role the people
might serve in constitutional interpretation, maintenance, and so forth. And so it
may be that the courts really should be primarily responsible, for example, for
protecting the rights of discrete and insular minorities-but the people might have
other important jobs. And third, it may be that both the Constitution and practical
necessity call for a popular role, so that even if it scares us, we need to start down
this path.
To illustrate those themes, I return to the debate over the meaning of the
Second Amendment. For decades, some have claimed that the amendment protects
an individual right to arms, and others have claimed that it protects only the power
of state governments to keep their militias armed. The primary legal issue in this
debate is gun control, and the primary policy issue is crime control: Do guns in
private hands increase or decrease the crime rate? But in the late twentieth century,
a new concept arrived to complicate this discussion: Some began to claim that the
original purpose of the Second Amendment was to ensure that the people could
resist the government by force of arms if it should become corrupt, as the American
revolutionaries had done in their War for Independence. This claim is far more
radical than the idea that private persons have the right to resist private crime,
because it challenges the state's very monopoly of force. As the political winds of
the 1990s became more heated and turbulent, the revolutionary Second
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Amendment was taken up by a variety of groups: the NRA, the militia movement,
certain feminists, certain Mrican-American activists, a group called Jews for the
Preservation of Firearms Ownership, and a few serious legal scholars.
With some mixed feelings, I list myself among that last group. I conclude that
our Second Amendment was born out of distrust of a central government, and it
was designed to allow for popular resistance to that government, even by force of
arms. I agree thus far with the NRA. But I would like to complicate matters still
further, because I don't think that the historical record is as simple as the NRA
would have it. NRA leaders argue that the amendment gives a right to individuals
to keep arms so as to make a revolution against government. But, as Handgun
Control might respond, that course portends anarchy. The Framers were acutely
aware of that risk, and that is why they imagined that the people could make a
revolution only as a collective whole, united by common ends, values, and
attitudes. They imagined this organic entity, "the People" (commonly capitalized,
as befits a proper noun) stalking across history, bearing arms, and making its own
future. They emphatically did not imagine random individuals each going his own
way, shooting at other random individuals.
Indeed, they had terminology for this distinction: They praised revolution,
defined as an uprising by the body of the citizenry for the body of the citizenry; but
they condemned rebellion, defined as an uprising by a faction for the interests of a
faction. George Washington led a revolution against the British Empire, so as to
create a nation born in blood. But once the genie of violence is let out of the bottle,
it's not easy to stuff it back in, and in the years after the Revolution, the
backcountry erupted in resistance against the new American governments, state and
federal. And these unwashed farmers had the effrontery to claim the warrant of
1776: Just as Washington threw off the yoke of British oppression, so did these
rural rebels seek to throw off the yoke of the eastern seaboard, with its distant
governments and alien ways. So we witness an interesting irony: Having created a
country through political violence, having staked their legitimacy on an act of
revolution, the governors of the country now sought to repress insurrectionaries
making the same claim. Yet the governors themselves saw no irony, because in
their view, 1776 was a revolution, for the people as a whole, but these new
insurrections were rebellions, made for debtors or rural people or general ne'er-dowells. In fact, in this view, rebellion is very similar to tyranny itself, because both
seek to direct political violence toward selfish ends. And so, in his own mind,
George Washington fought against the same basic threat both times, when he
contended first with George III and then later with the Whisky Rebels.
For that reason, the debate over the Second Amendment revolved around the
significance of the militia, because the militia was the institutional embodiment of
this collective people. In other words, it was just the People-with a capital "P"by another name. To understand this point, we need to understand how much our
legal imagination has changed since the eighteenth century. Today, the debate over
the meaning of the amendment is divided between those who believe that it
protects a purely individual right and those who believe that it protects a purely
state power. Our imagination has a hard time conceiving of a middle term between
the state and private persons, and yet that is precisely where the eighteenth century
militia fell. On the one hand, the militia had clear connections with the state: In
theory, the state raised it, ensured that it comprised the whole people, and trained it
to virtue. On the other hand, if the state should become corrupt, the militia was
supposed to resist it in the name of the people, because it comprised the Body of
the People. So what we have here is a universal entity that is yet not the state. That

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:379

status is hugely important, because the Framers thought that you could trust the
militia with the means of violence only because it had that status. If the militia were
identical with the state, then it could not resist the state if it became corrupt. But if
the militia were only a bunch of atomistic individuals with guns in their hands and
anger in their hearts, then resistance could never amount to anything more than
rebellion or civil war-not a true revolution for the good of the whole.
All this may sound exotic to modem ears. We don't expect the people to
exhibit that kind of unity, and yet the eighteenth century debate over the Second
Amendment makes no sense unless we take this conceptualization seriously. As
just one example, I offer you Tench Coxe, who famously asked, "Who are the
militia? Are they not ourselves? Is it feared, then, that we shall turn our arms each
man against his own bosom? ' 7 Here is a vision of the People assembled in militia,
possessing such commonality that none could turn against any other, because it
would be like turning arms against himself. In like fashion, the Framers identified
the militia with what they called the Body of the People, and the organic metaphor
was intentional. The People acted as one body, and when any member of the body
was hurt, so were all. In fact, early drafts of the Second Amendment itself referred
to a militia composed of the Body of the People. Later drafts omitted that language
but apparently only for the sake of brevity: Everyone knew that a militia included
the Body of the People, so you didn't have to say so. It is only because the militia
is universal, organic, and trained to virtue that you can trust it with the means of
revolution. If it were a select militia or a standing army or a local faction, then by
definition it could make only a rebellion in a seditious interest, not a revolution by
the whole for the good of the whole.
This belief, that the People were fundamentally united, also makes sense of
what might otherwise seem a contradiction between the Second Amendment and
Article One of the Constitution. I have just argued that the Second Amendment
recognizes a right in the Body of the People to be armed so as to make a revolution.
And yet Article One gives Congress the power to define treason and suppress
insurrection. So how can these two be fit together-one provision that gives the
people the right to rise up, the other that gives government the power to put them
down? One answer is historical: One group of people (the Federalists) pushed for
Article One, with its empowerment of Congress, and in reaction another group (the
Anti-Federalists) pushed for the Second Amendment, with its celebration of the
militia. From this perspective, the two provisions might be simply contradictory
because they come from disagreeing groups. But any modem constitutional
interpreter must find that conclusion unsatisfactory, and happily, the two are more
coherent than would first appear, because their supporters shared more of a worldview than is often acknowledged.
Even the most ardent Federalists would have agreed that Congress has the
power to suppress rebellion but not true revolution, made by the Body of the
People for the Body of the People. And even the most fevered Anti-Federalist
would have concurred that the militia may make a revolution but not a rebellion.
Congress and the militia were thus both supposed to represent the Body of the

7. A Pennsylvanian, PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (John P. Kaminski
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., Supp. 1981) (1778-1780).
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People with its unified interests and views. They were twin routes for the
expression of the popular will, and each route acted as a check on each other.
Under ordinary circumstances, the federal government would undertake the routine
business of suppressing rebellion, but if that unrest should become general, the
People-in-Militia could launch a revolution. We hope that Congress will seek to
suppress only rebellion, not revolution, but if Congress becomes confused or
corrupt, the militia can correct it, speaking for the Body of the People. We hope
that citizens will rise only in revolution, not rebellion, but if they should become
confused or corrupt, Congress can take care of things, speaking for the Body of the
People. In every case, the stability of the system rested on the theoretical unity of
the People as the ultimate anchor in the constitutional organization of political
violence.
By contrast, the most salient feature of the modem debate is the way that
virtually everyone presupposes a citizenry wracked by division, violence, and
hatred. Indeed, for modem commentators, the point in the Second Amendment is
not to allow a unified people to overawe a few erring government officials. The
point instead is to allow the good people (true Americans, however described) to
control the bad people (traitors defined in various ways) by force of arms. The fact
that almost all commentators agree on this portrait is the more striking because they
disagree on almost everything else, particularly who the good and bad people are.
In fact, the Second Amendment and gun ownership are central icons in not one but
many cultural conflicts in America today: They have become symbols not of our
unity but of what divides us. And these Second Amendment fables are disturbingly
on the rise: More and more people have apparently become so frustrated with the
normal political processes of mutual accommodation that they have turned to
fantasies of violent, constitutionally sanctioned revenge. These people feel that
America has failed to protect them or accord them the place that they are due, and
they assert that the Second Amendment is a remedial provision for their lot.
A good part of my recent book is devoted to exploring this modern landscape
of the Second Amendment-the folkloric Constitution, if you will.8 Any quick
summary would fail to do justice to the remarkable discourse now going on,
particularly the way that people take their deepest fears and hopes and render them
into constitutional stories, so that others will have to take notice. But let me add
one anecdote to make the general point. When I speak on the Second Amendment,
I sometimes pose a hypothetical. Suppose that we adopt a militia like
Switzerland's. We issue assault rifles to every citizen, and we tell them to use those
guns to resist the government if it should become corrupt. Then I ask: How many
think that the people could be counted on to use their guns only for unified
revolution? How many think that the people would instead use them mostly for
civil war or ordinary crime? In other words, which is more likely: 1776 or the
bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City? In general, the only people
who think that Americans would use their guns as a single body are those who have
a particular vision of the American citizenry: In their minds, it includes only people
like them. When they are reminded that we are talking about arming all Americans
in all their magnificent diversity, they generally change their answer.

8. See DAVID C. WILLIAMs, THE MYTHic MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ACONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003).
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Notice, then, how this particular issue-Second Amendment revolutioninstantiates the larger issue of civic constitutionalism in general. In both, we
encounter the idea that the people as a whole should have some direct
responsibility for constitutional maintenance, interpretation, or unmaking. Yet in
both, when we seriously consider the possibility, we blanch at the thoughtbecause of a fear that the people are fractured and irresponsible. Many would
therefore suggest that we abandon this line of thought. It is better, in this view, to
accept that the Constitution has become the property of the government,
particularly the Supreme Court, and the people as citizens have moved into a
peripheral role. The People are unruly in the literal sense, and so they must be kept
within bounds. Perhaps they have some role in setting policy, but not in
determining the fundamental framework.
And yet just as the Second Amendment illustrates the problem with civic
constitutionalism, it also illustrates the reasons that we should not and perhaps
cannot abandon the project altogether. First, both the Constitution and practical
necessity may require a popular role in the organization of political violence, both
private and governmental. Second, we need not imagine this role as dichotomouseither the government has a monopoly of violence or the citizenry does; instead, we
might imagine an important role for both. And finally, we need to understand that
the popular role may be incremental and gradual: The people should control the
means of violence only insofar as they show the necessary characteristics, not as a
matter of absolute individual right.
I will elaborate a little on each. First, the Second Amendment contemplates
that the Body of the People should have a central role in the organization of
political violence: In Congress, the People spoke indirectly, and in the militia it
spoke directly on whether resistance to government was appropriate in a particular
instance. Now it may be that the citizenry does not possess the commonality to
speak in that unified way, so that by its own terms, the Second Amendment cannot
bear its original meaning. Some might conclude therefore that the amendment has
become outdated, so that we can abandon it with a twinge of conscience. But
before we rush to that conclusion, a different course might recommend itself:
Perhaps fidelity to our constitutional tradition suggests that we should ponder
whether we can work toward creating that degree of connection on the use of
political violence.
And if we did ponder this bit of the tradition, we might also discover that
practical necessity strongly suggests that in a democratic republic, the people must
be given a role in the domestication of political violence. As I mentioned earlier,
many writers argue that the Second Amendment gives private individuals a right to
arms to resist the government. Now I think that view bad history, but I also think
that it would lead to disastrous results, as the bombing at Oklahoma City should
remind us. But those at the other side of the spectrum are no less mistaken. In their
view, the amendment guarantees only a state power to maintain the militia so as to
keep local order. Again, I think that view bad history, as it proceeds from a modem
conviction that the state must command a monopoly of violence. But I also think
that it would lead to an untenable state of affairs, because it imagines that the
strong arm of the state can keep us in line if it has all the guns. What both of these
views fail to realize, in other words, is that the Framers gave the means of violence
to the Body of the People because they felt practically compelled to do so. If we are
not one body, then we must turn either to disparate individuals or to the
government to save us from ourselves. And in the long run, neither course will
work. If we are a stable country, it is because we want to be. If we are intent on
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killing each other, we will, and no distribution of arms will save us-not if there is
an assault weapon in every closet, and not if there is an assault weapon in no closet.
In other words, today, Second Amendment work does not primarily consist in
deciding who gets the guns in a fractured, hate-filled, and dangerous landscape.
Instead, it consists in the grueling work of constituting the people as a body, so that
we don't have to live in that landscape anymore, so that there really will be
someone we can trust with the guns, and that someone is us-not us as individuals
nor us as the government but us as the American citizenry. And again
paradoxically, our current Second Amendment myths actually make that prospect
less likely, because they seek to convince us that common devotion is never
possible, that the Second Amendment requires distrust and suspicion everywhere
and always-and that is why we hold tight to our guns.
What that means is that under modem circumstances, Second Amendment
work must be transformative and dynamic. And for that reason, the meaning of the
Second Amendment-to the extent that it can be given meaning in the modern
world-is neither absolute nor fixed. Instead, it will require imagination and
experimentation. Again, we should not view this as an either/or choice: Either the
state is the master or the citizens are. Instead, in realizing the amendment's ideals,
state and citizenry must undertake an active relationship, dividing power the better
to tame it. And that relationship should be evolutionary, as the people find new
ways to assume responsibility for their own safety. The amendment cannot counsel
giving ultimate power over violence to a fractured populace, but it might counsel
giving more and more responsibility to citizens as they become capable of taming
that violence for the general good.
How we might construct those connections-how we might do that Second
Amendment work-is a subject too large for this lecture, which is already too long,
though I pay it some attention in the book. Today, I would like only to draw
attention to one final irony, which forms a piece of this construction project. As I
suggested at the beginning of the talk, the Second Amendment is commonly taken
as a symbol of the danger that we pose to one another: It's a jungle out there, so
you better hold tight to your guns--or else make sure that the government has all of
them. If only we (the good people) can dominate them (the bad ones) through force
of arms, then all will be well. In fact, however, the Second Amendment really
symbolizes just how deeply and desperately and hopelessly we depend on each
other. If we are not a People, if we cannot do civic constitutionalism, if we cannot
develop shared norms on the use of political violence, then we will surely face an
endless series of Oklahoma Cities and Wacos. The Second Amendment, which to
so many promises personal safety in the blued steel of a gun barrel, really promises
only ultimate vulnerability. Without each other, we cannot tame the violence loose
among us. And yet the world for which the Second Amendment yearns is made so
difficult precisely by the world which the amendment is generally taken to
represent. Once you have gone out into the world and been hurt, once you realize
the danger that your fellow citizens pose, it is easier to stop hoping for more. It
seems safer to trust in a gun.
So I close this lecture in the way that I close the book, with a fear and a hope:
It is a lot to hope for that sort of mutual devotion in a large,
multicultural democracy. In the scheme of history, it may seem a
miracle that humans ever tame political violence long enough to plan
their lives in peace and promise, drinking up the good things that life
can offer. It seems even more of a miracle that we could tame violence
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through connection while still respecting freedom and diversity. And
yet miracles happen because people believe they can happen. In 1776,
few would have believed that women and people of color would ever
enjoy formal-if not yet truly substantive-equality. Yet they do,
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possible for others to share their conviction. In 1976, few would have
believed that democracy was about to sweep the world, bringing down
one totalitarian government after another. And yet it did, because
citizens of those governments found a way to believe that they could
change the world in solidarity. As hope grows on hope, trust grows on
trust, and love grows on love, and they all grow on the resources that
our myths offer us. If we live out our stories, then, we need to be sure to
tell the right ones, as they set the limits of our future. And to heal the
violence that scars us, even as we recognize the fears and threats on
every side, 9we must incorrigibly insist on believing in stories of endless
possibility.

9. Id. at 326.

